Who Holds the Balance of Power in 2050?

Geopolitical expert Dario Fabbri for Moneyfarm…

In 2050, the same superpowers as today, along with some rising powers destined to increase their influence over time, will compete for global hegemony. Unless unlikely cataclysms occur, the United States will still dominate the international stage. Despite internal turbulence, it remains unrivalled due to greater demographic vitality, military and technological superiority, and geographical location. They attract millions of immigrants, act as a counterbalance to the ageing population typical of Western Europe, and possess an unparalleled naval force with expertise in navigation and control of maritime routes. They are the main beneficiaries of technologies, later adopted globally, developed by the Pentagon.

These structural factors are decisive and unlikely to be overturned within a quarter of a century. Additionally, the existence of the United States outside the Eurasian mass, where global supremacy has always been decided, further reinforces their position. When squeezed between two potential hegemons, countries consistently choose the geographically more distant one because they imagine that it will eventually disappear (unlike a neighbour). This calculation suggests that various governments prefer Washington, a preference that will be confirmed over time. Furthermore, the United States lacks a true rival in its backyard, which will not be Mexico or Brazil.

By 2050, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will have just celebrated its centennial. By that time, the structural deficiencies that already plague the country today may become more apparent. The premature ageing of the population is a strategic challenge for those who seek to dominate the planet and envision warfare to achieve their objectives. There is a growing divide between the prosperous coast and the still impoverished inland regions, and an inability to control coastal waters or even conquer Taiwan. These difficulties will prevent Beijing from replacing the United States and may lead to the risk of implosion.

In the immediate future, Beijing will attempt to reverse the demographic trend—allowing families to have up to three children—to reduce the gap between the coast and the inland regions. This will be achieved primarily by investing a portion of the wealth gained from the trade surplus into the interior regions. The United States, however, will try to complicate this strategy by imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, possibly increasing them in the medium term. Washington’s objective is to shift production to countries neighbouring China, partially including itself. This trade war could potentially escalate into a military conflict, likely centred around Taiwan. For now, Beijing struggles to conquer the island militarily, but it knows it must act within the medium term; otherwise, its population risks becoming too old to undertake such an endeavour.

Russia will continue to exist between China and the United States, with its power gradually diminishing over the years. An internal revolution will only be possible if Moscow loses the war in Ukraine on the ground. Strategically, the conflict has already been lost, but tactically, the Russian army continues to occupy Ukrainian territories. This reality temporarily appeases the anger of the population, historically inclined to overthrow its regime only if it is defeated or humiliated abroad. The question will be whether Moscow aligns itself closer to Beijing or Washington. The war in Ukraine has pushed Russia into the clutches of China, and it is now forced to primarily sell discounted gas to the Middle Kingdom. According to some theories, the United States should open up to the Kremlin to keep it away from the Chinese Dragon. This development currently seems science fiction-like but could become a reality in the near future, especially as Russia loses much of its status.

Turkey, Japan, and India will have an enhanced role in future dynamics. Ankara will increase its influence in Central Asia and much of the Middle East, mainly at the expense of Russia and Iran. However, it will face severe consequences for overextension, including financial retaliation, primarily from the United States.

Japan will invest in its own rearmament and occupy the space that China will be forced to relinquish in the Indo-Pacific region.

India will continue to be a formidable adversary to the People’s Republic of China, contributing to the containment organised by the United States against Beijing. However, India will not become a definitive ally of Washington nor move closer to global hegemony. Neither a nation nor an empire, Delhi will continue to exist dangerously in a region filled with enemies.

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom will continue to align themselves with the United States, with Paris and London having a vibrant demography but lacking the means to pursue great achievements. Germany will soon have to decide what it wants to be in terms of its global role, whether to invest in armed forces and redistribute its wealth more within the Eurozone. It will likely prefer not to make a decision, partly due to significant pressure from the United States.